that is the usual shorthand context given for interpreting the significance of Mills' most famous book.
There is no question that Mills' sociology and his self-understanding as a sociologist were in this period both greatly influenced by the looming figure of Max Weber. As Mills notes even in the passage just quoted, at the time he first began to plan The Power Elite he had been working with Hans Gerth on Weber "since god knows when," which is to say, since roughly 1939, when Mills arrived at the University of Wisconsin to pursue doctoral work in sociology and soon thereafter began a productive if also notorious collaboration with Gerth, the brilliant German émigré widely acknowledged for his considerable knowledge of Weber as well as, even more impressively, that to which Weber addressed himself (see Oakes and Vidich 1999) . Indeed, the analysis in The Power Elite most certainly owes more to Weber than any other social thinker, for Mills' study of the "command posts" of power stands or falls with a Weberian understanding of modern bureaucratization. This is the case even though, ironically, Weber's name never appears in the text and even though Weber's monumental oeuvre is cited only once, this, tangentially and via reference to From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) , translated and edited by Gerth and Mills.
But it is not the presence or absence of Weber's acknowledged or unacknowledged influence that is presently at issue. Mills had already, in White Collar, for example, explicitly acknowledged Weber's paramount, and Marx's nearequal, importance for Mills' own "general perspective" (1951: 357) . Rather, the more pointed question concerns of which aspect of Weber's multifaceted sociology predominates in the text, and of the increasing relative influence of Marx, various Marxian theorists, and Frankfurt School theorists in particular, evident in its pages. For in The Power Elite, we see Mills doing something much more than merely rounding-out his trilogy on power with a value-neutral analysis of increasingly hierarchal bureaucratic organizations that concentrate and integrate power at their apexes, something akin to an application of Roberto Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" to the mid-century American national political scene (see Michels 1996) .
[2] Instead, we see Mills much more closely following the example of the Max Weber who was riveted by immediate political concerns, often personally engaged in Weimar politics, and more than willing to issue damning judgments on the hypocrisy and irresponsibility of governing elites and the culture, or lack thereof, they countenanced, encouraged, and very often fed off. As Weber was to the Kaiser, so was Mills to Eisenhower and, later, Kennedy (see Diggins 1999) .
But it goes beyond style and bravado. More than at any time prior in his career, The Power Elite finds Mills wedding historical and political concerns-a focus on the process of history-making generally and the prospects for democratic history-making and the making of modern democracy in particular-to structural analyses. This is where Wolfe especially wants off the Good Ship Mills. As noted above, for Wolfe, The Power Elite "is really two books," one that is sociological analysis written in a "somewhat clinical language" and "driven by data" and "extensive original research," the other written using a "language of outrage" in which Mills presents himself as though as a "biblical prophet" predicting "doom" and "harshly denouncing 'the second rate mind' and the 'ponderously spoken platitude '" (2000: 377-78) . But this two-books reading begs the integrity of Mills' argument. What if Mills' structural analysis and his historicizing and, indeed, radical social criticism cannot be separated from one another without violating the work's raison d'etre? What if accepting Mills' structural analysis of the concentration and integration of power leads quite logically and necessarily to an analysis of those who wield that power and the historically specific projects to which they apply its use? Weber did this, as did Marx. So, too, beginning most clearly with The Power Elite, did C. Wright Mills. This is why it is curious and unfortunate that Wolfe's assessment makes no mention of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for that such a thing was not only possible, but probable, is arguably the great animating force running throughout The Power Elite and spilling out into all, or very nearly all, of Mills' subsequent publications. It is this fact that interpreters of Mills generally either miss or under play. Perhaps it is that they give Mills' own "trilogy" self-assessment too much weight. Having established himself as a tenured member of the discipline's leading faculty, the mid-1950's saw Mills set his aim on what for him would be a higher ambition, not higher for personal rewards (although Oakes and Vidich would disagree), but higher in the sense of being historically relevant, that is to say, influential on a scale that shaped history-making, which meant, as an American, simply on a national scale. International respectability and alliances were edifying and useful and, alas, nonessential. Due to the specifics of modern historical social development, influencing the American course of history was tantamount to influencing the total course of human history.
Thus, The Power Elite not only addresses the concentration of power, it is itself an attempt to exercise a form of power. In it, Mills moves from being an excellent sociologist to being an excellent sociologist who is also a skilled political writer.
[3] He hoped to be so skilled, in fact, that his interventions directly into public life-as he called them, in an act of self-deprecation, his "preachings"-would bypass the academy and be accepted to some meaningful degree by publics. Only through their democratic actions would there result tangible, meaningful historical difference in the direction of social change. Not so much hubris as the result of dismay and alarm (or perhaps a mixture of all three), Mills sought to engage what he called the mindless "main drift" of a bureaucratically determined historymaking set-up, which he saw (and not him alone, of course) as tending toward the worldwide spread of bureaucratic unfreedom and permanent war among competing undemocratic national elites. This historical situation was, as it were, historically unprecedented and grave. The first-half of the twentieth century featured two world wars and the use of atomic bombs followed by the advent and deployment of thermonuclear weapon systems. The threat of continued worldwide military conflict and large-scale nuclear war was real. To avert an apocalyptic war by restoring the realistic hope of reason and freedom playing a predominant role in the conduct of human affairs, this is what motivated The Power Elite and its author.
Understood as such, we can see that The Power Elite has little to do with perpetually answering the question, "Who Rules America?" (Domhoff 2005 (Domhoff [1967 ), nor does it make sense that in its wake there were inspired innumerable studies of the increasing integration of corporate and government power and various and sundry subsequent insults this has caused to "the public interest" (for a review of the "corporate liberalism" literature in political sociology, see Cornoy 1984) . Indeed, the emergence generally of a so-called "critical sociology" that is manifestly inspired by Mills is largely out of sync, not only with a basic grasp of the factual situation that Mills addresses in The Power Elite, but also with all of his "preachings" following thereafter. Mills was not interested in establishing a Millsian branch of sociology that set up its own self-marginalizing journals and professional societies and that used Paul Lazarfeld's preferred methods of research to study topics of interest to left-liberal social critics. Not only The Power Elite, but The Sociological Imagination (1959), Images of Man (1960b) , and other more clearly "sociological" subsequent works make this point abundantly clear, or so one might have imagined.
Mills' interest, which he shared with sociology's founders, was the totality of modern and, increasingly, postmodern society. The Power Elite announces an interest in direct participation in the making of human history in the hope of directly affecting its outcome. This is the only reasonable understanding of his self-described "plain Marxism" and the only interpretive framework that makes sense of his dedication to helping to form a "new left." Horowitz therefore exaggerates only slightly when he notes that:
Mills's …defense of 'plain Marxism' and his growingly strident attack on 'liberalism as a dead end,' must each be seen as an ultimate rejection of Weber…(1983: 186) .
As the Frankfurt School demonstrated better than any other group of social theorists, it is readily possible to incorporate the considerable fruits of Weber's penetrating analyses of the "administered world" into a critical theory of society. This is how The Power Elite should be read, as marking Mills' emergence as a pragmatist-trained and distinctively American critical theorist of society. [4] Merely four years later, Mills would find himself riding around Cuba in a Jeep with Fidel Castro while President John F. Kennedy was forced to explain to a visiting French journalist critical of U.S. policy toward Cuba, "I'm not some sociologist, I'm President of the United States" (Beschloss 1991: 658) .
II. Playing in Peoria, Port Huron, and the Pentagon
It is one kind of irony that The Power Elite would emerge in a society in which many of its leading social analysts, Daniel Bell prominent among them, were actively declaring "the end of ideology" (see Bell 2000 Bell [1962 , Mills 1960 ). Yet it was a far more disconcerting irony that the ideology of the end of ideology was in fact gaining empirical credence by its institutionalization and enculturation in a mid-century "American way of life." The contemporary value of The Power Elite is very much tied to its prescient analysis of the process through which mass society was reproducing itself out of itself. The emergent social totality was one in which "the cultural apparatus" and its celebrity-producing star-system played an ever-greater role in defining the meaning of collective human experience, such that the taken-for-granted "culture" increasingly acquired a commercial and centrally administered quality. Ultimately, as the distance from autonomous, spontaneous, and local culture increased, "culture" became sufficiently ethereal in its cynical self-understanding to accept with little fuss its unabashed use as ideological support for seemingly any political expediency. The preponderance of myriad mass broadcast circuses led Mills to be among the first to pronounce the onset of a "fourth epoch," a "post-modern society" defined by the eclipse of autonomous individuality in possession of reason and freedom as operative cultural realities. In place of modernity, Mills feared that "cheerful robots" would strut on the stage of strip mall and sidewalk sale, the mirror image of "the higher immorality" in a society polarized between obscene concentrations of power and equally obscene forms of powerlessness (see Mills 1959 , Ryan 1976 , Dandaneau 2001 .
This sort of descriptive rhetoric drives critics like Alan Wolfe crazy. As Wolfe writes:
As he brings his book to an end, Mills adopts a term once strongly identified with conservative political theorists. Appalled by the spread of democracy, conservative European writers proclaimed the twentieth century as the age of 'mass society.'
'The United States is not altogether a mass society,' Mills wrote, but he then went on to write as if it were.
Mills had become so persuaded of the power of the power elite that he seemed to have lost all hope that the American people could find themselves and put a stop to the abuses he detected (2000: 379-380).
In these passages, Wolfe accuses Mills of antidemocratic allegiances, disingenuous writing, and self-delusion. Wolfe also regards Mills as arrogant and irresponsible as well as, in the end, anti-American. But Wolfe may underestimate how amenable Mills' legacy has been to the type of "affirmative culture" analyzed by Herbert Marcuse (1969 Marcuse ( [1937 ). As noted previously, most of Mills' putative followers are usually content with "critical sociology" and making award of the C. Wright Mills Award.
[5] Certainly, Oxford's New Edition of The Power Elite, featuring Wolfe's damning appraisal of at least half of the book (not to mention the character of its author), does little to promote Mills' point of view in Peoria.
In Mills' defense, however, he does in fact write that "the United States is not altogether a mass society"; indeed, his overriding point is succinctly and clearly rendered as follows: "The bottom of this society is politically fragmented, and even as a passive fact, increasingly powerless: at the bottom there is emerging a mass society" (1956: 324, emphasis added). As a critical theorist, Mills aimed to counteract what he saw as a rapidly developing tendency toward corruption of democratic life by clearly identifying the emerging, alarming threat to its vitality: in a word, bureaucratization. Mills wrote The Power Elite so that it would be accessible to what ever remained of a reading public (not unlike much of the best of Wolfe's sociology), in the hope that his clarion call might contribute to efforts to forestall and reverse what he regarded as an obviously perverse and, needless to say, anti-American social tendency. This is hardly the behavior of a social critic who is rejecting communication with the world around him, his own society included. For this charge to stick to the wall, it would be necessary to explain why Mills poured his heart into The Causes of World War Three (1958), which sold over 100,000 copies, Listen, Yankee! (1960), which sold over 400,000, and such overtly political tracts as "Letter to the New Left" (1960a), which rejects political complacency among even the disheartened and marginal defenders of the ideals of social equality and participatory self-government. Horowtiz seems much closer to the mark: Mills was "An American Utopian," the subtitle of his biography, although certainly a more radical critic than Emerson, Whitman, or Wolfe. Perhaps it is that the critic of "the American Celebration" doesn't play as well as assigned reading in the canon of The PBS-sanctioned American Experience. Given, however, Mills' increasing use as the stuff of 50's nostalgia (see Halberstam 1994) , no one in today's postmodern society should be surprised if Mills were required reading Peoria Central High School. Politically speaking, it wouldn't matter.
When not ensnared in nostalgia for "New York in the 50's" (see Eyerman's oft-cited retrospective, simply as Seeds of the Sixties (1994). So, the kids were reading Mills and, later, Marcuse, who himself went out of his way in the preface to OneDimensional Man (1964) to acknowledge Mills' importance. [6] But what of the power elite themselves? Did they read Mills? Other than with respect to Fidel Castro, who is said to have held discussions on The Power Elite whilst hold-up in Sierra Maestra, we may never know how far Mills' analysis of power elites penetrated their elite, guarded inner sanctums. There is no evidence, for example, that President Eisenhower or his speech writers drew even indirectly from Mills in composing Eisenhower's nonetheless pointed farewell critique of "the military-industrial complex." And even though Mills traveled to the Soviet Union and Poland, there is no evidence that his often-confrontational engagements with communist officials in either country led them, much less their superiors and their superiors still further up, to any sort of intellectual or political engagement with his ideas. And while Mills is likely to have been on President Kennedy's mind in the passage quoted above in interaction with French journalist, Jean Daniel, there is no evidence that Kennedy actually read Listen, Yankee!, such as he later claimed, famously, with respect to Michael Harrington's The Other America.
But it is not therefore irrelevant that Eisenhower would issue an analysis so clearly consonant with Mills'. In fact, it would be hard to imagine a figure more clearly embodying the characteristics of Mills' prototypical member of the power elite than Dwight David Eisenhower himself, former Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, President of Columbia University, and two-term President of the United States. That Ike sat down to tell The Great American People to beware "the total influence-economic, political, even spiritual" of "the military-industrial complex" ought to weigh, it seems, rather heavily in our appraisal of The Power Elite. That he did so firm in the conviction that "[t]he potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist," should be counted among the most ringing endorsements any thesis has ever, anywhere, received.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together (1961).
So the general-turned-president and political leader of the conservative party chose to take leave of office, on national television, in prime time. Perhaps this individual member of the power elite was not as "mindless" as Mills feared commonplace, but, sadly, his particular act of self-criticism had as little consequence as Mills' structural analysis of bureaucratic mindlessness predicted.
III. The Best Evidence
It is one thing to discuss particular responses to the work, quite another to come full-face with the workings of what the book is about. That is, academics [7] can spill ink all day and night on the text, The Power Elite, but the far more important subject is that which the book addresses: actually existing power elites.
Here, social science-positivist or critical or what have you-quickly runs up against an especially delicate and confounding conundrum: a social science thesis that, if correct, cannot be sufficiently supported by evidence. If Mills' analysis were essentially if not entirely accurate, then the very power elite he had identified would, by definition, enjoy sufficient power to more or less prevent exposure of its most undemocratic acts. In other words, if Mills is right that the United States is governed by an unelected, unaccountable, increasingly integrated and, not unimportantly, increasingly self-conscious power elite, then these self-same individuals would presumably recognize the danger to the legitimacy of the system of power in which they occupy the top positions posed by exposure to social science and, from there, to a reading public. Some, like Eisenhower, might go public with their concerns. But the majority of such an elite would no doubt equate "national security" and the security of the power elite in toto, thus establishing safeguards and methods designed to buffer elite decision-makers from public scrutiny and subsequent accountability.
A social science of political power-in this society, at this point in its historical development-would then, presumably, be left looking for what ever skimpy evidence of such machinations is available. Not an exactly quixotic endeavor, however. After all, history is replete with cases-in-point of the fact that even the exceedingly powerful make mistakes. And as human beings who are operating in human institutions, even the so-called power elite must necessarily leave traces, and perhaps a great deal more than that, of its workings. Finally, it bears to recall that power-especially a claim to total power-is never simply given; elite structure, like all social structure, is in constant need of reproduction.
The empirically minded social scientist might thus query: Are new legal and administrative institutions of government being created as substitutes for existing democratic seats of power? Are ideological justifications for politically expedient uses of authority being created and propounded as necessary and just? Are undemocratic methods for the control of information, election of leaders, repression of dissent, and support of vested interests being devised? Social science might also, of course, benefit from occasional or not-so-occasional slip-ups in the prosecution of various elite-directed projects. The blanket term "scandal" describes these, but it also obfuscates their significance. The sociologist is interested in scandals rooted in structural arrangements, that is, systematically produced scandal, not those resulting from idiosyncratic or merely personal failings. Reasonable inferences might follow from the latter concerning the institutional structure of power as such, whereas the former distract attraction form the latter and potentially confuse the would-be citizen-analyst.
Mills notes that the growth of the power elite, with respect to which "the military ascendancy" is essential, dates from "Pearl Harbor" (see 1956: 198) . The fear aroused by a military attack against the United States and the immediate national resolve to enter wholesale into the second world war of the century was wedded to an already vastly enlarged New Deal state bureaucracy, the result being a "greatly speeded up" increase in the concentration and integration of national power (1956: 274) . Less often discussed is the fact that numerous observers at the time and, presently, on the basis of historical documents newly available to researchers, many more, are left incredulous by the fact that the U.S. Navy broke the Japanese military code only some 100-odd days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. This code-breaking achievement is celebrated because it was essential to the decisive U.S. naval victory in the Battle of Midway in June, 1942, a mere seven months after Pearl Harbor. And while school children are taught that Pearl Harbor was a horrible defeat of U.S. forces, the truth is that the fleet attacked that day was less its only strategically valuable vessels, three aircraft carriers (each on separate missions), and that therefore the result of the attack, which led to the U.S. entry into the war in both theatres of conflict, was a disaster for Imperial Japan's long-term war aims [8] .
Fast-forward from December, 1941, to the first days of the Truman Administration. The three-term president is dead. Just as the fourth-term commences, the now-former Vice President must be informed by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not only of the existence of the Manhattan Project, but of the need to use its fruits vis-à-vis as fresh targets in Japan. This same Harry S. Truman, never really an insider to the power elite even during his presidency, would sign into law the National Security Act of 1948, creating institutions whose very purpose was to provide the executive and the military-intelligence branch of government freedom from democratic constraint and accountability. He would also engage the United States in what was effectively a spatially and technologically contained version of World War III with China (Eastasia) and the Soviet Union (Eurasia) on the Korean Peninsula, and find it necessary a short time later to remove a glaringly insubordinate general from command of what amounted to U.S. protectorates, colonies, and Legions in Asia. For this, Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt, and a good many of their fellow Democrats were denounced by the hysterical anticommunist right wing-followers of MacArthur and McCarthy-as highly suspect if not thoroughly un-American. In this world, Eisenhower and the Administration most directly analyzed by Mills between the pages of The Power Elite thus came to power.
Under Eisenhower (and, when he was ill, Vice President Nixon as acting president), the United States developed, deployed, and continuously expanded a capacity to exterminate human life worldwide via thermonuclear weapons (a fact both so common and so profound that it is worth pausing for a moment to ponder). Against the backdrop of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests and non-stop construction of missile silos, nuclear submarines, and intercontinental bombers, the simultaneous on-going covert political and military intervention in myriad ostensibly sovereign nationstates' internal political affairs, including use of violence against heads of state, must have seemed minor. Where subversion was not possible, the Eisenhower Administration did not hesitate to use espionage, such as regular U-2 flyovers of the Soviet Union, including, for example, on May Day, 1960.
Here we arrive at the onset of what T.V. historian Michael Beschloss (1991) calls "the crisis years," 1960-1963. Given its position as following The Power Elite but not so distant as to allow for intervening structural change, this brief but highly eventful historical period may provide the best evidence for Mills' thesis in The Power Elite. The furor that erupted upon the downing of Francis Gary Power's U-2 spy plane ended years of calculated rapprochement pursued by Eisenhower. There would be no trip by the Eisenhower family to the Soviet Union mirroring Khrushchev's early tour of the United States. Less than one year later, a new President would refuse to risk world war by authorizing full-scale military support for what became known as "the Bay of Pigs" invasion, a CIA-led effort by Cuban exiles to overthrow the revolutionary government of Cuba. During this period, President Kennedy, a former Navy Ensign, further undermined his never-good credibility with the military-industrial establishment by threatening action against U.S. Steel (using a national television broadcast, no less), and by pursuing policies that threatened the favorable extra-normal profits that accrued regularly to other key oligopolistic industries, oil among them. From the point of view of the elite members of the committed anticommunist right wing, President Kennedy's womanizing and risky self-medication, the suspect electioneering in Illinois and elsewhere in 1960, not to mention his tentative support for the Civil Rights Movement, must have been viewed as relatively less grievous than his support for a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, his inaction during the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, and his pointed and, seemingly, growing hesitancy concerning the prospect of full-scale U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. The American University Commencement Address, the so-called Peace Speech, of June, 1963, would have been nothing but the coup de grace in a fundamentally disturbing trend.
But before conciliatory, even philosophical, speeches about peaceful coexistence between elites Soviet and American, there would first be a nuclear standoff the likes of which the world has never seen before or since. If 1960 gave us the U-2 incident and 1961 the Bay of Pigs, 1962 featured the crisis par excellence, the Cuban Missile Crisis. As historians have now shown, the U.S. military chiefs wanted nothing but war with Cuba, and, by extension, war with the Soviet Union. They also wanted nothing but full-scale war in Vietnam and its immediate environs. While these facts are now well known, it is cause for extra pause and reflection. Mills' thesis pointed to an increasingly integrated elite composed primarily of the national political directorate (namely, the president and his inner circle, particular in matters of national security), the military elite (namely, the joint chiefs and their immediate subordinates), and the corporate elite (namely, the CEO's and Board Chairs and their immediate lieutenants among the top 50 or 100 multinational corporations). President Kennedy showed that merely the scion of a rich and politically involved New England family, using personal wealth and the power of celebrity to his advantage, could obtain the nation's highest elected office. Still, he did not mesh comfortably with the existing elites, especially those exercising power outside the direct reach of his authority. Imagine the gulf in sensibility between Kennedy and his Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay of Columbus, Ohio, who cut his teeth overseeing the firebombing of Tokyo while JFK was merely commanding PT-109. No disinterested military bureaucrat, LeMay, it is often overlooked, would serve as George Wallace's Vice Presidential running mate in 1968. But neither MacArthur nor, later, LeMay, crossed the Rubicon (at least not openly), and Kennedy's personal stand against many of his many senior advisors, including military advisors, LeMay prominent among them, meant that war with Cuba would be relegated to a costly and ultimately ridiculous Operation Mongoose and a still-on-going merciless trade embargo.
In these same years, Mills himself, as did other sociologists, acquired FBI surveillance (see Keen 1999 , Dandaneau 2001 . The internal civil liberties of American citizens had long been violated on a scale so massive as even today to defy comprehension by most people. Intelligence agencies spied on American citizens and harassed legitimate political organizations. Unsuspecting soldiers, whole cities and communities as well as specific minority groups, such as African-Americans and disabled children, were subjected to life-threatening radiation testing, sterilization, and other forms of heinous, Nazi-like biomedical experimentation (see Department of Energy c. 1994). Intelligence agencies engaged in proactive counterintelligence operations against groups identified secretly as threats to the vaguely understood "national security," including the FBI's now-infamous COINTELLPRO's that began in 1956 and continued until 1971, when they were exposed.
Mills' FBI files are comparatively pedestrian to that which would be, for example, eventually amassed in response to Malcolm X and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Most of the 200-odd pages are of little historical interest. The files do reveal, however, that Mills received a death threat and that he was moved to purchase a pistol for self-protection. Unfortunately, significant passages of these files are redacted, and we still do not know today the identity of the halfa-dozen or so informants who reported on Mills' whereabouts and activities. Likewise, the CIA, for its part, claims to have no substantive files on Mills, which is typical of CIA responsiveness to Freedom of Information Act requests. One might expect Central Intelligence Agency to have monitored an American citizen who traveled more than once to the Soviet Union, to Poland, and who worked with Fidel Castro and his government, not to mention who lectured widely as a severe critic, not just of U.S. foreign policy generally, but with respect to the most sensitive point in the pressure vice known as the Cold War: Cuba.
Mills died in March of 1962. He suffered a second major heart attack. The first occurred in 1960 just prior to a scheduled national television debate on NBC on the subject of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Kennedy's June, 1963 , Commencement Address at American University, which Kennedy delivered six months before his assassination and which is perhaps second only to Eisenhower's Farewell as free copy for the veracity of The Power Elite. Kennedy told the graduates that day:
I have…chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth too rarely perceived. And that is the most important topic on earth: peace. What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace….
I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces….
Today the expenditures of billons of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need them is essential to the keeping of peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles-which can only destroy and never create-is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace….
Calling repeatedly for American self-critique and the eventual abolition of Cold War mentalities and institutions, Kennedy staked his presidency, and his reelection, on the avoidance of what he called a "collective death-wish for the world."
From the point of view of assessing The Power Elite, the key point is to underscore that the events heretofore discussed did not occur upon debate in Congress or after national public discussion. In fact, little of the history that has occupied the last several paragraphs was even known until relatively recently, to well-informed citizens or otherwise, most of whom might have been simply dumbstruck or more likely obstinately incredulous were she or he have somehow learned of it as it was unfolding: e.g., "What do you mean, 'President Johnson disavows the Warren Commission Report?!'" [9] That the American people are largely left with a pack of failed Congressional investigations and sensationalist Hollywood movies in response to these deadly sobering events-events which also led to the downfall of Khrushchev, not insignificantly, and the ascendancy in the Soviet Union of a comparably illiberal governing elite-is itself an indication of the undemocratic structure of the American polis extending forward in time from the early 1960's.
Thus, as we now know, the Gulf of Tokin Resolution, an act of Congress giving carte blanche to the Johnson Administration in its zeal to escalate the war in Vietnam, was based on wholly erroneous intelligence. And, as we now know, the Nixon Campaign's efforts to forestall a peaceful conclusion of the War in Vietnam in 1968 helped secure the former Vice President's election to the presidency that just barely eluded him in 1960, this, whereas previously only the murder of his principal political foe, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, was known to be the key event opening the door to Nixon's rehabilitation as a national political force and his subsequent policies that included liberal domestic programs as well as the prosecution of a secret, unauthorized war in Cambodia and the murder of democratically elected heads of state and counterrevolutionary insurgency elsewhere in the world.
Rightly or wrongly, the Watergate Scandal, of course, is the mother of all scandals in American political history, but its basic structure as a de facto coup d'etat is rarely acknowledged. Mostly rooted in illegal attempts to shape the election of 1972 (in which Governor Wallace was severely wounded in an assassination attempt), Watergate provides an unusual glimpse into a gapping whole in the fabric of systemic elite obfuscation. Top members of the national intelligence establishment, including but not limited to Mark Felt, purposively leaked information that they hoped would be fatally damaging to President Nixon's legitimacy. And, it was. A failed, law-breaking, and psychologically fragile president was thus forced from office by covert actions of the elite establishment surrounding him. That the Supreme Court demanded subpoenaed evidence and that Congress prepared articles of impeachment does not vitiate the fact that neither branch of federal government would have had knowledge of Nixon's crimes, such as we do know of them, without the instigation of an illicit process of delegitimation from secretive actors within government who lacked legal authority for their actions.
This concerns only what is acknowledged and known. But, in the case of Watergate, we also know at least one thing precisely that we do not know, which is rare. We know that someone deemed it necessary to erase 18.5 minutes of presidential conversation from the infamous Watergate Tapes. The National Archive in Washington D.C. suggests, in their display of the actual tape-recorder, that the erased conversation probably concerned the break-in at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee Chairperson. Whether this speculation is accurate or not is not likely ever to be known, although Nixon's Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, the person with whom President Nixon was conversing during time in which the gap in the tape recording appears, noted in his posthumously published memoir that, when President Nixon curiously referred to the Bay of Pigs invasion, which he often did, Nixon, speculated Haldeman, was actually referring to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Haldeman 1978 (Haldeman , 1994 . One imagines a tired reader. A reader who does not now want to be reminded again of the flimsy evidence suggesting, as in 1968, a similar campaign-led effort to alter the outcome of the election in 1980, or the armsfor-hostages and later arms-for-money deals associated with President Reagan's senior National Security Council advisors and his Administration's illegal war in Nicaragua (see Sick 1991) . Furthermore, one imagines that President G. H. W. Bush's stunning and incredibly brutal seizure of the President of Panama by means of military invasion, as depicted, for example, in the Academy Award-winning documentary, Panama Deception, is relatively familiar to most readers, as would be Ambassador April Glaspie's utterance before reporters made famous by H. Ross Perot in his on-air, mid-debate assault on George H. W. Bush: "Obviously," said the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, "I didn't think, and nobody else did, that he Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait," referring to informal U.S. communications with Saddam Hussein prior to Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. And certainly, readers of this publication need not be reminded of the election of 2000 or events subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 2001, in which jets were crashed or were intended to crash into symbols of each of Mills' elite triad.
Even if the details of this or that "scandal" are doubtful and perhaps more the product of paranoid fantasy than established historical fact, the crucial question remains, does Mills' The Power Elite, now 50 years dated, anticipate the structures and processes standing back of the undemocratic concentrations of coordinated power that have been used on a regular basis to prosecute acts which stand in violation of U.S. and international law as well as that contradict the principles of American democracy which are the putative sources of legitimacy for the American state? Yes or no?
The 60's social movements helped to check some of the most blatant abuses of the power elite. Were it not for the activists who burglarized the FBI in 1971, well before the Church Committee was impaneled, the world would not, for example, know anything about COINTELLPRO (see Cunningham 1994) . And, certainly, the anti-war movement was a significant factor in the tragic, tortured withdrawal-but still, the withdrawal-of U.S. forces from Vietnam. Yet, qualifications aside, even a simple listing of key (known) events in U.S. political history since 1956 suggests, apart from rare but heroic moments of countervailing struggle, a more or less uninterrupted continuation of (apparent) usurpations. Indeed, it is reasonable to speculate that, in the absence of a fundamental collapse in its structure, the power elite's worst "crimes," as Pinter suggests as the proper vocabulary, are probably not yet known nor likely ever to be sufficiently documented, at least sufficiently documented so as to meet the test of a tape-recorded confession, the so-called "smoking gun" test, which is perhaps the most ironic product of Watergate. Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation, Kennedy's American University Address, H. R. Haldeman's memoirs-and testimony from abroad, particularly in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellite regimes-are as close to a smoking gun as Mills and his way of analyzing power are likely to get.
IV. Is Mills Winston Smith or Emmanuel Goldstein?
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four is arguably the most discussed and most familiar single work in twentiethcentury English language literature, yet it is, nonetheless, rarely well understood (see Dandaneau and Falcone 1998[10] ). In the usual reading, Winston Smith is the book's hero, O'Brien its villain. But Smith, a middle-level functionary, is as self-deluded as the Proles he disparages as often as glorifies. They horde the petty material goods of life while he, Winston, hordes shaving razors and a sense of his own historical importance; they consume beer and pornography ("prole feed"), while he covets Victory Gin and his diary; Smith denounces the Proles' ignorance while he takes pleasure in expertly rewriting history, his work at the Ministry of Truth. Vis-à-vis the Inner Party, Smith is similarly self-deluded. O'Brien entraps Smith with deceit and then proceeds to torture him, but Smith cannot
